Shareholder Theory/Shareholder Value by O\u27Connell, Maeve & Ward, Anne Marie
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Articles School of Accounting and Finance 
2020-3 
Shareholder Theory/Shareholder Value 
Maeve O'Connell 
maeve.oconnell@tudblin.ie, maeve.oconnell@tudublin.ie 
Anne Marie Ward 
University of Ulster, Emaiam.ward@ulster.ac.uk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/buschacart 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Recommended Citation 
O’Connell M., Ward A.M. (2020) Shareholder Theory/Shareholder Value. In: Idowu S., Schmidpeter R., 
Capaldi N., Zu L., Del Baldo M., Abreu R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management. Springer, Cham. 
Online ISBN:978-3-030-02006-4 doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02006-4 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open 
access by the School of Accounting and Finance at 
ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Articles by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU 
Dublin. For more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
SShareholder Theory/
Shareholder Value
Maeve O’Connell1 and Anne Marie Ward2
1Technological University Dublin, Dublin,
Ireland
2Ulster Business School, Ulster University,
Newtownabbey, Northern Ireland
Synonyms
Shareholder primacy theory; Shareholder value
creation; Shareholder value maximization; Share-
holder wealth maximization; Shareholder-centric
approach
Definition/Description
Shareholder theory states that the primary objec-
tive of management is to maximize shareholder
value. This objective ranks in front of the interests
of other corporate stakeholders, such as
employees, suppliers, customers, and society.
Shareholder theory argues that shareholders are
the ultimate owners of a corporate’s assets, and
thus, the priority for managers and boards is to
protect and grow these assets for the benefit of
shareholders. Shareholder theory assumes that
shareholders value corporate assets with two mea-
surable metrics, dividends and share price. There-
fore, management should make decisions that
maximize the combined value of dividends and
share price increases. However, shareholder the-
ory fails to consider that shareholders and corpo-
rates may have other objectives that are not based
on financial performance. For example, as early as
1932, Berle and Means argued that corporations
have a variety of purposes and interests including
encouraging entrepreneurship, innovation, and
building communities. This wider view is gaining
more traction in recent decades as evidenced by an
increased interest in ethical investment funds.
This suggests that shareholders and potential
shareholders are not only interested in financial
gains but are also interested in corporates being
socially responsible (Kyriakou 2018). Therefore
shareholder value creation is important; however,
it needs to be balanced with other stakeholders’
interests. This is referred to as an enlightened
approach to shareholder value maximization.
This entry outlines the origins of shareholder
value theory, provides a rationale for prioritizing
shareholder value theory, documents arguments
for taking a wider view beyond shareholder
value, and explains enlightened shareholder
value.
The Origins of Shareholder Value Theory
The origin of shareholder value maximization as
the primary objective of corporates was
influenced by changes in the structure of busi-
nesses, the economic environment, and
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financialization of the markets. These are now
outlined in brief.
Business structure and the economic environ-
ment: The roots of shareholder value theory can be
traced to the late eighteenth century when the
capital investment required to finance innovative
manufacturing businesses during the industrial
revolution led to a change in the structure of
businesses, from traditional small family-run cor-
porates to large publicly owned corporates with
dispersed shareholders and professional man-
agers. This change in governance, called
managerialism, led to new modes of coordinating
enterprise, technology, and planning. From the
1970s, the focus on managerialism gave way to
a growing focus on shareholder value maximiza-
tion. The economic environment is considered to
have contributed to this change in focus. The
1970s was a challenging time for US corporates
as they experienced a decline in competitiveness
due to the rise of foreign corporates. The result
was decreases in their share prices. Questions
were being asked about the performance of man-
agement in this era. The widespread reduction in
the value of corporate stocks led to a focus by
business leaders, policy makers, regulators, and
politicians throughout the 1980s and 1990s on the
role of the board and their duty and relationship to
shareholders. In particular, agency theory, an eco-
nomic theory that argues that humans are inher-
ently self-serving, was deemed to provide an
appropriate explanation for the poor performance
of corporates. The view being that boards were
taking decisions that benefited directors, not
shareholders. This resulted in the widespread pro-
motion of shareholder wealth maximization as the
primary goal of corporates. Directors were not
opposed to this approach as they believed that
by focusing on wealth maximization, they could
avoid their corporate being the target of a takeover
bid. This reason was particularly pertinent in the
1980s as a wave of merger activity was sweeping
through major stock markets. In addition to being
a defense against takeover, a focus on wealth
maximization also led to calls for the alignment
of director and shareholder incentives. The result
was a higher executive director pay that was typ-
ically linked to share price increases. This further
motivated management to focus on shareholder
wealth maximization. However, it is also argued
to have fueled a focus on short-term gains that
benefit transient investors and directors, to the
detriment of long-term shareholders and other
stakeholders that are interested in the sustainabil-
ity of the corporate (Clarke and Friedman 2016;
Englander and Kaufman 2004).
Financialization: During the 1980s financial
institutions became substantial investors in corpo-
rate shares. Financial institutions pursue wealth
maximization as their primary investment objec-
tive. This increased attention from well-informed
investors and led to pressure on directors to
deliver high returns on their tangible assets. If
high returns are not reported, then corporates
faced the risk of being taken over and broken up.
This shifted the priorities of corporates to cost-
cutting, divesture, outsourcing, and offshoring as
managers did whatever was necessary to meet the
earnings expectations of the market (Dallas 2017).
Improvements in information technology in the
1980s and 1990s also resulted in easier access to
information on corporates, increased interest from
a wider range of investors and hence greater
liquidity in the stock market. In particular, it
enabled more trading by transient shareholders
whose main focus is liquidating short-term abnor-
mal gains. The shift in focus to reporting short-
term gains is argued to conflict with the long-term
sustainability of corporates.
The arguments for and against the pursuit of
shareholder wealth maximization are now
outlined in brief.
The Rationale for Prioritizing
Shareholder Value
Four main arguments in support of the primacy of
shareholders over other stakeholders are
forwarded in the literature; the agency perspec-
tive, the control perspective, the residual claims
perspective, and congruence with social wealth.
The agency perspective: The first view, the
agency perspective, is that directors have a con-
tractual obligation to prioritize shareholder value
maximization over other stakeholder claims.
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Under agency theory the corporate is seen as a
“nexus of contracts” (Alchian and Demsetz 1973).
Shareholders are the owners. They are external to
the corporate and hence cannot manage the cor-
porate. Therefore, shareholders hire agents (man-
aging boards) to protect their interests and to run
the corporate on their behalf (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). To fulfill their contractual obli-
gation, boards should take decisions that promote
the long-term sustainability of the corporate. The
traditional view is that long-term sustainability is
synonymous with financial prowess. Therefore,
the focus should be on financial decision-making
that maximizes shareholder value in terms of div-
idend returns and increases in share price. This
traditional view is captured by Friedman when he
stated: “Few trends could so thoroughly under-
mine the foundations of our free society as the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social
responsibility other than to make as much
money for their stockholders as possible” (Fried-
man 1970, p. 113). Friedman went on to explain
that catering for multiple stakeholders with multi-
ple objectives increases the risk of managerial
mismanagement and may even conflict with
shareholder wealth. Therefore, the role of the
board is to manage, grow, and protect shareholder
assets. This can be achieved by a focus on sus-
tainable development.
Control: Under the control view, shareholders
are the controlling influence and hence the most
important stakeholder. Each share has voting
rights and though shareholders transfer their con-
trol rights to the governing board to run the cor-
porate on their behalf, they have influence over
the board. They can attend annual general meet-
ings and remove individual directors, and they can
influence board decision-making through their
voting rights at meetings. Therefore, though they
have transferred operational decision-making
control to the board, shareholders retain ultimate
control. As a result, shareholders are the most
important stakeholder, and the governing board,
managers, and employees should act to maximize
shareholder wealth. The maximization of share-
holder wealth is achievable when long-term sus-
tainability is achieved.
Residual claims: Shareholders provide funds
to the corporate for investment. The corporate
invests these funds in assets. Therefore, any assets
purchased with shareholders’ funds are the prop-
erty of the shareholders. However, under law, the
contractual rights of other claimants, such as
employees and suppliers, rank in front of share-
holders’ contractual claims. This means that
shareholders are only entitled to the residual
value when the corporate is wound up after all
other contractual claimants have been satisfied.
Consequentially, shareholders bear more risk and
hence have a greater interest in the corporate’s
long-term sustainability relative to other stake-
holders. Each decision made by the board has a
direct impact on shareholder wealth, whereas all
other stakeholder claims are typically fixed.
Therefore, governing boards should focus on
maximizing equity shareholder wealth as this
will ensure the long-term sustainability of the
corporate.
Congruence with social wealth: A fourth argu-
ment in support of shareholder value maximiza-
tion is that it has value for the wider society. When
governing boards focus on shareholder wealth
maximization, this results in benefits for other
stakeholders. For example, to increase sales reve-
nues, policies may be introduced that improve
customer service or provide a wider product
range. This will lead to additional profits for
shareholders as customers return more often.
However, it also benefits customers who experi-
ence higher quality service and have access to a
wider range of products. Similarly, to reduce staff
recruitment costs, a corporate might invest in staff
training or introduce flexible working hours. This
will cut costs due to lower staff turnover, lower
sick rates, and improved productivity from hap-
pier workers. The changes are also beneficial for
workers who increase their human capital by
gaining new skills and can better manage their
work-life balance. In addition, financial gains to
shareholders will also have a societal impact as in
modern developed economies, a majority of the
population have investment in stock markets. This
investment may be direct, through the purchase of
shares, or indirect, through their pension funds.
Thus a focus on shareholder value is argued to be
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beneficial for society at large. Politicians in sev-
eral jurisdictions have equated the performance of
the stock market with the interests of their voting
public (Cioffi and Höpner 2006).
Why Take a Wider View Beyond
Shareholder Value
As early as 1992, Michael Porter claimed that
economic instability and insecurity results from
a focus on shareholder value maximization. More
recently Clarke (2015) argued that the relentless
search for returns, regardless of the consequences,
and the self-interest and irresponsibility embodied
in the pursuit of shareholder value, was at the
heart of corporate scandals, such as Enron and
WorldCom in the early 2000s, and the reckless
excesses leading to the global financial crisis of
2008. Moreover, government bailouts of banking
corporations in the aftermath of the financial cri-
sis, with the associated short- and long-term costs
to taxpayers, indicate that an excessive focus on
maximizing shareholder wealth not only damages
shareholders but also has a negative impact on
society.
Some opposing arguments for the rationale
forwarded under agency theory, control, residual
claims, and congruence with social welfare are
now outlined.
Agency theory: Agency theory identifies that
directors could be self-serving at the expense of
shareholders and that this can have negative con-
sequences for the long-run sustainability of a cor-
porate. It argues that monitoring directors and
incentive alignment that leads to decision-making
that is congruent with shareholder value maximi-
zation should result in director decision-making
that is consistent with shareholder value maximi-
zation. However, the empirical literature is incon-
clusive as to whether methods used to reduce
agency, lead to better outcomes for shareholders
(Pargendler 2016). There are plenty of examples
of corporate failures despite clean audit reports by
auditors, for example, Enron. In addition, it is
claimed that techniques used to align board deci-
sion-making, for example, share options, have not
curbed dysfunctional decision-making, for
example, Nortel. It would seem that agency theory
is an oversimplification of the complexity and
heterogeneity of financial and corporate reality.
Economics is not the only driver of human inter-
actions; it is also shared by politics, ideologies,
legal systems, social conventions, modes of
thought, etc. (Letza et al. 2008). Therefore, a
focus on shareholder wealth is appealing for its
simplicity but fails to take into account the com-
plexity of the corporate world.
Control: While shareholders own shares in
corporations, they are defined under law as sepa-
rate legal entities. They exist separate to their
aggregate members, with their own rights and
duties that do not derive from the rights of their
shareholders (Letza et al. 2008). Therefore, as
distinct social entities, the directors’ duty is to
each distinct entity, not the aggregate
shareholders.
Residual claims: Though shareholders are not
guaranteed a return, they are not the only stake-
holder to invest in corporations without a
guaranteed return. Taxpayers, through govern-
ment agencies, and employees, also invest in cor-
porations without a guaranteed return.
Government agencies provide infrastructure that
corporations use and may even directly provide
grants or subsidies to corporations. The return is
tax revenues and societal gain. Employees make
investments in “corporation-specific” human cap-
ital and unpaid hours of input with the expectation
that they will reap returns (wages) from that cor-
poration in the future. When the role is special-
ized, or the employee is older, their mobility is
impaired and the potential loss in terms of future
returns (wages) is greater. Employees cannot
diversify their investment as easily as share-
holders can. In addition, shareholders can exit at
any time. This is not as easy for taxpayer invest-
ment or for some employees. Therefore, it could
be argued that shareholders are not the key risk
takers, as other stakeholders such as taxpayers and
employees also face considerable risk. Indeed,
their loss when a corporation fails may be even
greater than shareholders’ losses.
Congruence with social wealth: Pargendler
(2016) suggests that there is little congruence
between focusing on shareholder value and social
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wealth. They find that share price increases do not
benefit society equally, that the wealthiest 10% of
the population own 81% of the stock, whereas the
bottom 80% of the population hold 9% of shares.
Moreover, given this skewed concentration of
ownership, shareholders have few incentives to
act as stewards for the public good. Thus, there
is little overlap between the interests of share-
holders and those of wider society. Pargendler’s
(2016) conclusion focused on the outcome of the
pursuit of financial objectives, where the output is
dividends and share price increases; however,
there are other beneficial outcomes from corporate
sustainability that benefit the wider stakeholder
body. Recognition of these benefits has led to
calls for an approach termed “enlightened share-
holder value.”
Enlightened Shareholder Value
Under shareholder value theory, the corporate is
viewed as a body of shareholders with the board’s
duty to the shareholders. Shareholder value theory
also assumes there is a single, common and uni-
form measure of shareholder value, dividends and
share price increases, and that shareholders are
only interested in financial returns. However,
this may not be an appropriate assumption. As
early as the 1970s, activist shareholders have sub-
mitted proposals on social issues at annual general
meetings. This suggests that shareholders have
interests other than financial returns and that by
catering for other stakeholder interests, boards are
in fact catering for shareholder interests. More-
over, furthering shareholder value is not mandated
under corporate law (Stout 2012), and the law has
imposed duties on boards to other stakeholders,
such as to employees and suppliers. For example,
in the UK (Companies Act 2006) and Ireland
(Companies Act 2014), directors have a duty to
promote the success of the corporate for the ben-
efit of its shareholders while having regard to the
interests of employees and to creditors generally,
particularly in times of threatened insolvency. A
stakeholder-orientated approach to governance is
evident in continental Europe and Japan where
shareholder value and stakeholder interests are
not separate and isolated from each other but
interdependent, mutually influential, and recipro-
cally supportive (Letza et al. 2008). More widely,
investors in many markets reported that even
where a primary duty to shareholders is accepted,
this does not exclude engagement and action on
sustainability issues (Sullivan et al. 2015). This
approach is referred to as the “enlightened share-
holder value” approach.
The enlightened shareholder value approach
focuses on long-term value creation and the inter-
ests of various stakeholders, in advancing share-
holder value. Shareholder interests are
predominant; however, the promotion of their
interests does not require ignoring the interests
of other groups deemed to be important to the
success of the corporate. Boards are permitted to
take different stakeholder interests into account if
deemed to be congruent with long-term share-
holder wealth maximization. It would be hard
for boards to make decisions that treat the well-
being of employees or the environment as the
primary cause for action (unless based on other
legal obligations under employment or environ-
mental law). An enlightened approach does not
extend to additional rights for stakeholders, nor
does the approach prioritize other stakeholders at
the expense of shareholders. However, it argues
that all stakeholders benefit from a long-term view
and hence the sustainability of the corporate. As
with any corporate investment, investment in a
corporate stakeholder group should earn a return
for the whole corporate, and there is some tangen-
tial evidence to suggest that this is the case. For
example, De Klerk et al. (2015) report higher
share prices in corporates with higher levels of
sustainability disclosures. Thus it would seem that
sustainability and value maximization have the
potential to be complementary undertakings that
result in a virtuous circle in which “doing good”
helps companies do well, and doing well provides
the wherewithal to do more good (Martin et al.
2009). Policy makers also are promoting a more
enlightened approach. There are increasing legal
requirements on corporates to publish on social
and environmental matters, for example, the EU
Non-Financial Reporting Directive 2014/95/EU.
In addition, stock exchanges have started to
require their members to comply with Corporate
Governance Codes that contain requirements on
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disclosures of social and environmental matters
(KPMG 2017a).
A refocus to enlightened shareholder value
is consistent with the growing numbers of
institutional investors who include sustainability
criteria and metrics when developing and
assessing portfolios of shares (Chen and
Scholtens 2018; Miralles-Quiros et al. 2017; Sul-
livan et al. 2015). EvenMichael Jensen, the cham-
pion of agency theory, has conceded that in order
to maximize value, managers must not only sat-
isfy but enlist the support of all corporate stake-
holders (Jensen 2002).
Summary
Taking an enlightened shareholder value
approach is not as clear cut as pursuing financial
objectives that result in stronger financial ratios,
higher dividends, and increases in share price.
Setting non-financial objectives is difficult as
there are measurement and reporting issues with
limited guidance from policy makers. However,
financial performance and sustainability are not
divorced from each other. Share price is a vital
indicator of corporate performance. It reflects the
underlying value of the corporate, including
potential future sustainability. Financial perfor-
mance is important not only for shareholders but
also for other stakeholders. For example, without
financial sustainability, employees’ future income
stream is at risk, suppliers’ future income stream
is at risk, customers’ access to products is at risk,
and the public cannot benefit from the infrastruc-
ture funded by tax and direct investment by
corporates.
Conflict typically arises between shareholders
and other stakeholders, not because of the pursuit
of financial objectives, but due to agency issues,
wherein self-serving boards make decisions that
focus on short-term gains that put the long-term
sustainability of the corporation at risk. This
approach only benefits short-term transitional
shareholders who trade for quick speculative
gains. This behavior does not serve the interests
of long-term shareholders, who are interested in
the sustainability of the corporate. As a result of
agency behavior, legislative and regulatory inter-
vention is required to ensure corporations respond
to the growing public demand, that they recognize
their wider social and environmental responsibil-
ities and avoid a singular focus on short-term
financial shareholder wealth maximization.
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